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to Inﬂ  uenza A 
(H5N1) from Family 
Clustering Data
Virginia E. Pitzer,* Sonja J. Olsen,† 
Carl T. Bergstrom,‡ Scott F. Dowell,† 
and Marc Lipsitch*
The apparent clustering of human cases of inﬂ  uenza A 
(H5N1) among blood relatives has been considered as evi-
dence of genetic variation in susceptibility. We show that, by 
chance alone, a high proportion of clusters are expected to 
be limited to blood relatives when infection is a rare event.
S
ince December 2003, 36 family clusters among 261 
conﬁ  rmed human cases of inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) have 
been documented (1,2). These clusters range in size from 
2 to 8 infected persons; in only 4 clusters were 2 unrelated 
family members (e.g., husband and wife) infected. This pat-
tern has been considered by the World Health Organization 
as evidence of genetic variation in susceptibility (3–5), but 
we show this observation provides little grounds for this in-
ference. We describe a null model in which nuclear families 
experience a common exposure to an avian inﬂ  uenza virus. 
The observed degree of clustering in blood relatives is con-
sistent with that expected by chance alone in the absence of 
genetic variation in susceptibility; other features of the data 
are also consistent with the null model.
Our model assumes all persons are equally susceptible, 
such that they have the same probability of infection, τ, and 
ignores possible human-to-human transmission (see online 
Technical Appendix, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/13/7/1074-Techapp.htm). The number of infected 
family members follows a binomial distribution with mean 
nτ, where n is the number of exposed persons in each fam-
ily. A cluster is deﬁ  ned as a family in which >1 person is 
infected; clusters are limited to blood relatives unless both 
parents are infected.
We compare our model to the observation that 32 of 
36 clusters that occurred from December 2003 to Decem-
ber 2006 consisted only of blood relatives (pB = 0.89, 95% 
conﬁ   dence interval 0.74–0.97; Table in online Techni-
cal Appendix). When the probability of infection is low, 
most clusters consist of 2 infected family members, and by 
simple combinatorics, these 2 are usually blood relatives, 
which is consistent with the observed date (Figure 1).
For a given a nuclear family size, the null model also 
predicts the proportion of all cases that are part of a clus-
ter and the average number of cases per cluster. Neither of 
these measures follows a simple distribution; we therefore 
use simulated data to determine what ranges of our param-
eters (τ and n) are consistent with the observed degree of 
clustering both in families and among blood relatives. We 
estimate the mean and 95% prediction intervals for the pro-
portion of cases occurring in clusters when there are 261 
cases, and for the average number of cases per cluster when 
there are 36 clusters. The expected proportion of cases oc-
curring in clusters is similar to the observed data when the 
probability of infection is low (τ<0.15) (Figure 2). The 
observed average number of cases per cluster, however, 
is consistent with slightly higher probabilities of infection, 
larger family sizes, or both (Figure 2).
The discrepancy between the number of cases per clus-
ter and the proportion of cases in clusters may be due to be-
tween-family variation in τ. If the probability of infection 
is low for members of most exposed families and higher 
for members of a few exposed families, then most cases 
may come from families in which τ is low, but most of the 
clusters will occur among families for which τ was higher. 
This will lead to a lower proportion of cases occurring in 
clusters and a higher average number of cases per cluster, 
as is observed. Although it is possible that such variation 
may be genetic, it could also result from between-house-
hold heterogeneity in intensity of exposure to infected birds 
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Figure 1. Proportion of clusters limited to blood relatives versus the 
probability of infection (τ) under the null hypothesis (no variation in 
susceptibility). Point estimate of the observed data is represented 
by the solid black line; the shaded region represents the 95% 
conﬁ  dence interval.Little Evidence for Genetic Susceptibility to Inﬂ  uenza
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(or intensity of shedding in birds to which different house-
holds are exposed), household hygiene, living conditions, 
and the like. Human-to-human transmission of the virus 
could also lead to larger than expected cluster sizes because 
having >1 case(s) within a family would increase the risk of 
subsequent cases occurring, and it could not be ruled out in 
several clusters (6,7).
Qualitatively, the data suggest the existence of nonge-
netic, between-household variation in risk. If such nonge-
netic variation were absent, then in any given village, nearly 
all pairs of cases occurring among unrelated persons in the 
same village would be in different households. Roughly, 
the chance that a pair of cases in unrelated persons in a vil-
lage would be from the same household as opposed to dif-
ferent households would be 1/H, where H is the number of 
households in a village. With 4 pairs of cases in unrelated 
persons in the same household, ≈4H pairs of cases would be 
expected within a village, mostly in different households. If 
the average village size of ≈138 households estimated for 
an area of Thailand (8) is typical, then if members of all 
households in a village were at equal risk, we would expect 
to see far more pairs of unrelated cases within a village 
than have actually been observed (4H ≈550 pairs of cases 
in unrelated persons, which greatly exceeds the observed 
261 total cases). Clearly, this argument is only heuristic, 
but when this argument is combined with the likelihood of 
biologic and behavioral differences between households, it 
seems likely that τ would vary considerably from 1 house-
hold to another.
Furthermore, the model does not account for addition-
al individual variability in susceptibility possibly related 
to age, level of exposure, or other risk factors. If younger 
persons have a higher risk for infection or likelihood of 
exposure, clustering would be promoted, primarily with-
in blood relatives, because siblings would be more likely 
than either parent to become infected. Approximately half 
of all cases have occurred in those <20 years of age (9). 
Similarly, if female persons (for example) were at higher 
risk for exposure, infection, or both, then clusters including 
non–blood relatives (e.g., spouses) would tend to include 
the low-risk sex and thus be less probable. Female persons 
of ages 10–29 years were slightly overrepresented among 
laboratory-conﬁ  rmed case-patients, but the difference was 
not statistically signiﬁ  cant (9).
The null model presented here is not designed to cap-
ture all of the heterogeneities in exposure and complexity 
of real families exposed to inﬂ  uenza subtype H5N1. Rather, 
it simply illustrates that a large proportion of family clus-
ters limited to blood relatives may occur by chance in the 
absence of genetic variation in susceptibility, particularly 
when the probability of infection is low and family sizes 
are large. Although genetic heterogeneity may possibly 
contribute to the clustering of avian inﬂ  uenza cases within 
blood relatives, it is neither a necessary nor the most likely 
explanation for the data currently available.
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